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Everybody hates bureaucracy—even bureaucrats hate bureaucracy (who likes stamping
forms all day long?)—but David Graeber hates it more than most. He hates it with an
anarchist’s hate. The Utopia of Rules is a clever, freewheeling, readable, and frequently
entertaining collection of essays (some previously published and some new) about
bureaucracy as a violent force.
Bureaucracy, Graeber tells us, has swallowed the modern world whole. If 40 years
ago, countless pamphlets, monographs, and satirical novels denounced the horrors and
absurdities of bureaucratic life, today, although the world is more bureaucratized than
ever, hardly anyone any longer complains about, or even cares to notice, the fact. BIt’s
as if, as a planetary civilization, we have decided to clap our hands over our ears and
start humming whenever the topic comes up^ (p. 5). How did this happen? Graeber’s
argument runs roughly like this. Modern Euro-American bureaucracy is a holdover of
the ancien régime: a newly clothed, but in its essence aristocratic, hierarchy of
command. Its primary role has always been the regulation, and indeed the creation,
of markets by governments (an argument Graeber set out in his earlier book Debt: the
first 5000 years). In the late nineteenth century, private businesses started to adopt
bureaucratic techniques, with the result that governments and businesses, especially in
Germany and the United States, became increasingly difficult to distinguish in their
modus operandi and culture. This is how corporations were born. After World War II,
the USA set up global bureaucracies—the United Nations and the Bretton Woods
organizations—thus projecting bureaucracy onto a planetary scale. The American
bureaucrat, and faith in the bureaucratic compulsion, has since conquered the world
and the minds of its denizens.




1 University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
For ordinary people around the globe, bureaucracy is not just a source of infinite tedium, it
is also the cause of existential violence. It violates our capacity to imagine, create, play, or even
think clearly; and in so doing it infringes upon the very essence of what it means to be human,
for imagination is what raises us above other mammals, writes Graeber, citing Edmund Leach.
BBureaucratic procedures… have an uncanny ability to make even the smartest people act like
idiots^ (p. 95). We all know the experience of ticking boxes, which depletes the will of even
the most imaginative and playful. But Graeber sees in box-ticking more than a momentary
numbing of the mind: bureaucracy Bradically strips down, simplifies, and ultimately prevents
communication … it is really a form of anti-action^ which interns the soul. Even more
treacherously, the bureaucratic process deludes us into believing that its spurious rationality
and impersonal quantitative techniques are sources—indeed the only viable sources—of
equality, justice, and fairness in the world. This could not, however, be further from the truth.
Bureaucracies are made of hierarchy and alienation, and they serve the private interests of
political and economic elites. They are the Bdemocratization of despotism^ (p. 164).
Graeber is not simply whinging. His book is a manifesto with a clear political aim. What
unsettles him at least as much as the iron clutch of bureaucracy is the fact that the political Left
had lost its grip. As the rebellious 1960s receded into a quaint memory,
the mainstream Left has increasingly reduced itself to fighting a kind of pathetic
rearguard action, trying to salvage remnants of the old welfare state…What is presented
as the Bmoderate^ Left solution to any social problems – and radical Left solutions are,
almost everywhere now, ruled out tout court – has invariably come to be some
nightmare fusion of the worst elements of bureaucracy and the worst elements of
capitalism. It’s as if someone had consciously tried to create the least appealing possible
political position.… The result is a political catastrophe… Every time there is a social
crisis, it is the Right, rather than the Left, which becomes the venue for the expression of
popular anger (p. 6).
Many of the book’s readers will no doubt share Graeber’s concern and be very interested in his
diagnosis. What they may find less convincing is the therapy he prescribes.
In Graeber’s view, what the Left needs to consolidate its position is a critique of
bureaucracy because Bthe Left, in its essence,^ he bracingly adds, Bis a critique of
bureaucracy.^ Its Bcurrent inability to formulate a critique of bureaucracy… is synony-
mous with the decline of the Left itself. Without such a critique, radical thought loses its
vital center – it collapses into a fragmented scatter of protests and demands^ (p. 83).
BThe Right, at least, has a critique of bureaucracy. It’s not a very good one. But at least it
exists^ (p. 6). To anyone who grew up in the Soviet Union (as I did), this will sound like
an implausible claim. Surely, the Left holds the welfare state—and the bureaucracy
it requires—very dear. You do not need to look to the Soviet Union to see this point.
John Maynard Keynes was (at one time in his life) a top bureaucrat, and dirigisme is a
decidedly Leftist system. In fact, most Left-leaning governmental practice has histori-
cally lain somewhere between Swedish welfarism and the Khmer Rouge.
But Graeber stands for a different Left. A career anarchist, he wants liberation
above all; more than welfare or public healthcare, and even more than social and
economic justice, of which he’s been a vociferous advocate. Graeber yearns for total
liberation: liberation from government rules and regulations, from boredom and
capitalism, inequality, law, corporations, tradition, and the police, and from
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bureaucracy’s Bsoulless conformity.^ A young anarchist group, whose manifesto he
approvingly quotes, gives voice to this yearning:
We must make our freedom by cutting holes in the fabric of this reality, by forging new
realities which will, in turn, fashion us. Putting yourself in new situations constantly is
the only way to ensure that you make your decisions unencumbered by the inertia of
habit, custom, law, or prejudice – and it is up to you to create these situations.
Freedom only exists in the moment of revolution. And those moments are not as rare as
you think. Change, revolutionary change, is going on constantly and everywhere – and
everyone plays a part in it, consciously or not (pp. 96–97).
During the first two chapters the reader will find herself wavering between feeling that
scales have been removed from her eyes and that conspiratorial wool has been pulled over
them. But by the time we are asked to cut holes in the fabric of reality, the book begins to read
like a millenarian screed.
But let’s stick with Graeber’s train of thought. What he seeks liberation from is quite clear—
anything that may stifle human playfulness, imagination, and will. Less apparent is what it is
for. What kind of a world lies beyond the threadbare veil of false reality spun for us by
American bureaucrats? And how do we get to the other side? Graeber writes, as he does in
Debt, that his ultimate aim is Ba world without states and capitalism^ (p. 97), a world where the
iron cage of bureaucracies, and indeed any abstracted regulatory regimes, would be obsolete.
This sounds rather enticing. One would never have to fill out another form, never again stand
in a queue for a visa. But how do we get there? BOn this point,^ writes Graeber, Bno one is
completely sure^ (ibid). BEndless improvization?^ BInsurrectionary moments?^ A Bcomplex
and multifaceted revolutionary process?^
Meanwhile, most of us need to eat, dress, live somewhere and, therefore, work. Some of us
may need to take trains to work. Now, if you needed to take a train, would you or would you
not prefer it to run on time? It may well be that Graeber does not like or need to take trains.
Since he tells us that he does not drive a car, it may be that he is waiting for flying cars to come
onto the market. (In chapter 2, he is genuinely aggrieved that, despite what he was told in the
1960s, there are still none around.) But it is difficult to imagine how a set of generalized
services that require coordination—a railway system, a postal service, a network of hospitals—
can work without abstracted procedures and rules. Can they operate on the Bprinciples of direct
democracy according to an elaborate… form of consensus process,^ which Graeber practiced
as a member of the New York Direct Action Network (DAN) (p. 84)? DAN may well be Bthe
best organized force^ ever encountered by the NYPD (p. 85), but an amusing incident gives a
sense of the organizational perils of direct democracy.
DAN did not have much of a budget, but one day, someone gave them a car, an event that
precipitated a serious crisis of coordination and responsibility. In the US cars can be legally
owned only by individuals or corporations, who are responsible for insuring, registering them,
and paying fines. As DAN was neither an individual nor a corporation, one of its members
volunteered to act as the car’s legal owner. Very soon, this brave soul became responsible for
insurance fees, multiple fines and for retrieving the car when somebody else in the group had it
impounded, and life became rather a nightmare. Failing to agree on how to deal with these
problems, DAN decided to throw a party at which guests could smash the car with a
sledgehammer, for a fee. Graeber writes that American law, with its narrow definition of
ownership and ascription of responsibility, was at fault. But to me it seems that the group’s
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Belaborate consensus process^ made it impossible to agree on who should do what, for whom,
how, and when. Car smashing is a fine anarchist spectacle. Cathartic though this may be, it
leaves behind only pieces that someone else needs to clean up. This liberation theology no
doubt carries some psychological appeal—at least for those Bof us [who] would like to smash a
bank or [a] shopping mall at least once in our lives^ (p. 213)—but it is difficult to see how it
can add up to a coherent political outlook, let alone a political strategy.
Psychology has much to answer for here. Again and again, Graeber hangs his polemic on
supposedly universal psychological states, like boredom or anxiety, which all humans sup-
posedly abhor. Why is bureaucracy bad for us? It is because it makes us bored. Why does it
nonetheless offer Bsecret joys?^ It is because by making rules explicit, it removes the anxiety
of living with ambiguous, unspoken rules. What good would removing bureaucracy do? It
would liberate our minds for the fun and the play that we yearn for. For a serious social
anthropologist like Graeber, this is an odd approach to adopt. Surely, not all humans—
including Americans and Brits—shape their political purposes through the categories of Bfun,^
Bangst,^ or Bboredom.^Many rituals studied by anthropologists around the world involve long
hours of waiting and isolation, repetitive gestures, and incantations lasting hours, days, or even
weeks. Yet no one—neither the anthropologists nor their informants—gets bored. Rituals are
worth the wait because they do important work in society. They turn children into adults, and
corpses into ancestors; they forge and sever relations, create and dissolve communities, affirm
and shift loyalties, and they may even spark revolts.
Bureaucratic processes do the same kind of work. To be alive in a socially meaningful
sense, it is not enough to emerge from your mother’s womb; to be dead, it is not enough to die
physically. To stand for elections or vote, it is not enough to know about a country’s politics,
nor is it enough to live somewhere to be a resident of that place. Who we are (alive, married,
doctors, or students) and what we have (cars, children) depends on these facts being bureau-
cratically inscribed. The Indian Association of the Dead, whose 20,000 undead citizens have
been falsely registered as deceased, fight to be recognized as living. Meanwhile, a dead
candidate, whose death was not registered, recently won an election. Insofar as bureaucratic
procedures perform transformative work through formalized and abstracted gestures and rules,
it makes good sense for anthropologists to think of them as socially constitutive rituals.
Graeber recognizes that paperwork Bactually effects change^ (p. 50), but he does not
want to take its social productivity seriously, the way he did with debt in his earlier book.
While Btraditional rituals^—Bemba female initiation or Balinese cockfights—are
Binfinitely rich^ and Bopen-ended,^ he insists that paperwork is Bdesigned to be maxi-
mally simple and self-contained.^ It Bdoesn’t really open on anything outside itself^; it is
a Bvacuum,^ even an Babyss,^ and so Bthere isn’t very much to interpret^ (pp. 52–53).
One may well feel vacuous or abysmal in the face of an interminable visa application or
an Ethics Approval Form. But the sizeable anthropological literature on bureaucracy, and
Graeber’s own account of his bureaucratic adventures, show that there is nothing
simplistic or hollow, nothing that would encourage Bthin description^ or generate writing
too dull to read. If it was good enough for Gogol and Kafka, surely it is good enough for
us. Only someone who has accepted Weber’s ideal type as a fact of life would think that
bureaucracy is inherently dull.
If, as Graeber (no doubt rightly) suggests, in the experience of many ordinary people,
bureaucracy is a game—with rules and regulations, prizes, disqualifications, and arbiters—
there is a world of difference between bureaucratic rules and how people play by them. It may
be that the American clerks Graeber dealt with saw fastidious adherence to rules as their chief
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virtue, but much bureaucratic practice in the world is much more creative: self-aware, tactical,
and even strategic. Few bureaucrats I have known in my life on four continents (including
Europe and North America) think of themselves primarily as mere custodians of correct
procedure.
I once tried to extend my research visa in a remote area of India. The clerk in the local
visa office was visibly displeased: he was large, it was August, and the Desert Cooler
was not coping well. He told me that I could secure my extension only in Delhi, not here.
His no really meant no. Did the rulebook really require me to travel to Delhi or was he
just making that up? Was this bureaucratic harassment because it was hot, because his
boss was out today, or because he was fed up with helping rich, hapless white people?
Whether or not one can fulfill one’s bureaucratic needs depends largely on who happens
to be at the desk and how much they like you. I have charmed my way through many
bureaucratic scenarios, and all it usually took was the knowledge of local language and a
couple of jokes, never a bribe.
Only rarely were my encounters with Indian bureaucrats impersonal. More often, they were
filled with sympathies, purposes, and interests. I will never know whether my various
extensions and permits were granted with the help of clerks who chose to overlook rules in
my favor or whether I would have got them faster if they Bjust followed the rules.^ What I do
know is that the Indian (and not only Indian) bureaucrats of all stripes are proud sovereigns of
their domains—as masterful at circumventing the rules as at making them up—and that
without their good will, your bureaucratic wishes will never come true. Their work is full of
political, economic, and even moral imagination, and it pursues purposes that are anything but
abstract. For them and their petitioners, it is a complicated, and often highly personal, game
that relies on a calculus of written rules, but cannot be reduced to it.
Bureaucracies, from ancient Mesopotamia to Xi Jinping’s China, carry emphatic dangers
and sometimes appear in hideous form, but they have also made it possible to coordinate social
life on a large scale since the invention of writing. Graeber can hope to wish bureaucracy away,
but by swapping regulation for autonomy, free choice, and the primacy of individual judgment,
he risks collusion with libertarians and the Right.
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